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Abstract	The	Raven’s	Progressive	Matrices	(RPM)	test	entails	a	40-min	contextualized	interaction	with	a	set	of	progressively	difficult	cognitive	activities.	Item-to-item	experiences	accumulate	to	total	scores	determined	by,	and	reflective	of,	cognitive	abilities.	The	current	research	is	interested	in	what	happens	during	those	40	minutes.	Personality	(Openness,	Extraversion	and	Neuroticism)	and	metacognitive	factors	have	consistently	been	associated,	albeit	at	low	levels,	with	performance.	252	industry	managers	completed,	inter	alia,	the	RPM	either	with	or	without	confidence	ratings.	Using	multi-level	modeling	and	controlling	for	general	ability,	we	investigate	whether	a)	experiential	factors	emerge	in	individual	performance	trajectories,	b)	whether	trajectories	are	associated	with	cognitive	and	personality	factors,	and	c)	whether	requirements	to	externalize	metacognitive	reflection	(provide	confidence	ratings)	links	to	performance.	Results	suggest	that	metacognitive	reflection	impeded	performance;	that	learning	trajectories	are	separable	from	performance	trajectories;	and	that	trajectories	are	statistically	moderated,	most	notably	by	Neuroticism,	over	and	above	cognitive	ability.	Modeling	item-level	responses	following	experimental	manipulations	that	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	modifying	cognition-personality	relations,	provides	an	important	avenue	for	integrating	experimental	and	differential	methods.	Psychometric	complexity	(ψC)	and	psychometric	learning	(ψL)	are	proposed	as	theoretically	derived	empirical	bases	to	ground	investigations	of	statistical	moderation.	Together	they	may	provide	a	bridge	to	causal	accounts	of	the	divide	between	intelligence	and	personality.					 	
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Beyond	the	intellect:	Complexity	and	learning	trajectories	in	Raven’s	Progressive	Matrices	
depend	on	self-regulatory	processes	and	conative	dispositions	The	Raven’s	Progressive	Matrices	(RPM)	is	a	widely	known	group-administered	test	of	general	fluid	intelligence	(Gf).	In	a	standard	administration	of	Set	II	of	the	advanced	RPM,	36	progressively	more	complex	items	are	presented	within	a	time	limit	of	40	minutes.	As	the	test	progresses,	each	successive	item	demands	induction	of	different	rules,	multiple	rules,	and/or	more	complex	instantiations	of	rules	from	earlier	items	(Carpenter,	Just,	&	Shell,	1990).	This	test	of	increasingly	complex	items	was	Raven’s	(1941)	operationalization	of	intelligence	as	the	capacity	to	perceive	relations	and	educe	correlates	(Spearman,	1927).	From	a	test-taker’s	perspective,	the	RPM	is	a	more	or	less	idiosyncratic	experience	with	distinct,	challenging	cognitive	activities	lasting	over	a	period	of	up	to	40	minutes.	Adopting	a	multi-level	approach,	the	current	research	is	interested	in	modeling	the	moderation	of	a	broad	range	of	between-person	differences	on	within-person	performance	trajectories	spanning	that	40	minutes.	As	the	basis	of	this,	we	note	that	modern	conceptualizations	of	intelligence,	cognitive	ability,	and	reasoning	as	they	are	realized	in	everyday	experiences,	warrant	greater	attention	toward	non-cognitive	influences	(Ackerman,	1988;	Sitzmann	&	Ely,	2011).	A	range	of	personality	and	metacognitive	factors	has	consistently	been	observed	to	be	associated	with	intellectual	performance	(Bandura,	1991;	Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011),	although	the	strengths	of	those	associations	tend	to	be	rather	small	for	all	but	a	few	of	these	factors.	The	goal	of	the	current	work	is	to	map	the	influence	of	personality	and	metacognitive	reflection,	not	simply	on	total	RPM	scores,	but	also	on	item-to-item	performance	trajectories.	For	reasons	to	be	presented,	we	focus	on	Openness,	Extraversion,	and	Neuroticism	as	moderating	personality	facets,	and	metacognitive	reflection	as	operationalized	by	the	requirement	to	provide	item-specific	confidence	ratings.		
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	 The	research	presented	here	aims	to	make	a	number	of	important	contributions.	First,	it	extends	investigations	of	the	cognition-personality	links	to	include	item-by-item	RPM	performance	trajectories.	Second,	it	investigates	whether	being	required	to	externalize	metacognitive	reflection	has	an	impact	on	RPM	performance.	Third,	building	on	Schweizer	and	colleagues	fixed-link	SEM	models	(e.g.,	Ren,	Goldhammer,	Moosbrugger,	&	Schweizer,	2012;	Schweizer,	2006),	which	distinguish	item-difficulty	from	item-position	effects,	it	introduces	a	theory-driven	conceptualization	of	statistical	moderation	of	performance	trajectories.	Finally,	the	research	benefits	from	sampling	experienced	business	managers	and	exposing	them	to	ecologically	valid	assessment	conditions	that	matter	to	the	individual.	We	begin	by	outlining	the	rationale	for	the	type	of	statistical	moderation	we	investigate.	
Conceptualizing	moderators	of	RPM	performance:	Psychometric	Complexity		Conceptually,	the	capacity	to	learn	and	to	deal	with	novelty	(Crawford,	1991;	Sternberg,	1985;	Sternberg	&	Gastel,	1989)	and	complexity	(Marshalek,	Lohman,	&	Snow,	1983;	Stankov,	2000)	have	been	regarded	as	reflecting	elementary	reasoning	abilities	central	to	Gf	(Carpenter	et	al.,	1990;	Primi,	2001).	At	a	task	level,	increasing	novelty	or	complexity	should	therefore	result	in	greater	demand	being	placed	on	Gf	resources,	and	hence	concomitantly,	be	associated	with	a	monotonic	increase	in	the	correlation	between	task	performance	and	measures	of	Gf	(Stankov	&	Crawford,	1993).	Birney	and	Bowman	(2009)	differentiated	process-oriented	psychometric	
complexity	factors	from	other	factors	that	make	solutions	difficult	but	do	not	necessarily	place	higher	demands	on	Gf	(and	thus	do	not	result	in	changes	of	Gf-performance	correlations).	They	investigated	Gf	processes	by	experimentally	manipulating	relational	processing	demands	of	reasoning	tasks	(Birney,	Halford,	&	Andrews,	2006;	Halford,	Wilson,	&	Phillips,	1998),	with	the	expectation	that	this	would	result	in	a	psychometric	complexity	effect	–	that	is,	an	increase	in	the	
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correlation	between	task	performance	and	independent	measures	of	Gf	as	complexity	of	the	items	increased.	Although	relational	reasoning	overall	was	correlated	with	Gf,	Birney	and	Bowman	found	
Gf	better	differentiated	test	takers’	capacity	to	maintain	information	across	multiple	steps	within	an	item	(i.e.,	serial	processing	demand),	rather	than	relational	complexity	differences	between-items.	That	the	psychometric	complexity	effect	was	present	only	as	a	function	of	within-problem	WM	demand	is	broadly	consistent	with	Engle	and	colleagues	who	argue	that	the	pervasive	correlation	between	WM	and	Gf	is	driven	by	the	capacity	for	controlled	attention	(e.g.,	Engle,	Tuholski,	Laughlin,	&	Conway,	1999;	Kane,	Hambrick,	&	Conway,	2005).		In	asking	the	question	of	whether	the	observed	progression	of	RPM	item	difficulty	is	a	function	of	a	psychometric	complexity	effect	or	some	other	difficulty	factor,	we	need	to	consider	the	processes	involved.	Prima	facie,	two	cognitive	factors	are	most	prominent,	reasoning	and	learning.	The	RPM	requires	an	individual	to	determine	the	answer	to	a	particular	problem	by	inductive	reasoning	with	a	relatively	small	set	of	rules	(Carpenter	et	al.,	1990).	Although	some	authors	have	suggested	that	learning	does	not	occur	in	tasks	like	the	RPM	(Alderton	&	Larson,	1990;	Sternberg,	2002),	others	have	presented	evidence	that	individuals	show	learning	effects	after	both	retesting	(Bors	&	Vigneau,	2001)	and	within	a	single	administration	(Bui	&	Birney,	2014;	Verguts	&	De	Boeck,	2002).	Verguts	and	De	Boeck	found	that	when	solving	RPM	items,	participants	tended	to	use	rules	that	they	had	previously	encountered	in	the	test,	thus	implying	at	least	some	learning.	Ren,	Wang,	Altmeyer,	and	Schweizer	(2014),	using	fixed-link	SEM	models	(Schweizer,	2006),	separated	out	learning	processes	from	performance	(i.e.,	reasoning)	processes	in	the	RPM,	showing	that	item-order	has	a	significant	association	with	performance	and	that	this	item-to-item	learning	process	accounted	for	a	substantial	proportion	of	the	remaining	systematic	variance	in	RPM	scores	after	item-difficulty	(reasoning)	had	been	considered.		
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In	essence,	and	challenging	common	uni-dimensionality	assumptions	(Birney	&	Sternberg,	2006),	these	are	two	factors	that	reliably	capture	individual	differences	in	RPM	performance,	but	do	so,	we	suggest,	by	acting	across	different	levels	of	the	test.	The	first,	uncontroversial	factor	is	an	ability	factor	(Gf	in	this	case)	that	is	stable	within	an	individual	but	differs	between	individuals.	The	second	factor	is	an	experiential	factor	associated	with	change	as	one	progresses	through	the	test.	This	second	factor	may	still	be	Gf,	albeit	instantiated	differently,	but	it	may	also	be	something	qualitatively	distinct,	for	instance,	attention	(Ren	et	al.,	2012)	or	even	impulsivity	(Lozano,	2015;	Ren,	Gong,	Chu,	&	Wang,	2017).	In	either	case,	it	is	a	within-person	factor	operating	at,	or	more	accurately,	emerging	across,	items.		Following	the	goal	of	Ren	et	al.	(2014),	we	aim	to	separate	the	role	of	learning	from	performance	within	RPM,	but	do	so	using	a	multi-level	modeling	(MLM)	approach	(rather	than	SEM)	and	with	a	broad	array	of	cognitive	and	personality	moderators	in	a	sample	of	high-functioning	working	adults.	First,	controlling	for	item-to-item	experience	(i.e.,	item-order),	we	conceptualize	psychometric	complexity	(ψC)	as	a	statistical	moderation	of	the	cognitive	demand	of	items	on	performance	trajectories	(what	Ren	et	al.,	2012,	refer	to	as	the	ability-specific	component	of	fluid	reasoning).	Second,	controlling	for	item-to-item	difficulty,	we	conceptualize	psychometric	
learning	(ψL)	as	a	statistical	moderation	of	item	experience	on	performance	trajectories	(Ren	et	al.	refer	to	this	as	the	position-specific	component	of	fluid	reasoning).	In	the	following	sections	we	explicate	potential	personality	and	metacognitive	moderators	of	these	relationships.	
Broader	determinants	of	RPM	performance:	Cognition-Personality	Links	and	Self-Regulation		 Beyond	cognitive	ability,	RPM	performance	trajectories	can	be	characterized	by	both	task-relevant	factors	(e.g.,	emerging	knowledge	of	rules)	and	task-irrelevant	factors	(e.g.,	evolving	confidence	in	one’s	capacity	to	perform).	Task-relevant	learning	is	germane	and	intrinsically	
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connected	to	performance	(Sweller,	Van	Merriënboer,	&	Paas,	1998),	and	task-relevant	reflection	on	reasoning	is	typically	considered	to	facilitate	this	(Mitchum,	Kelley,	&	Fox,	2016).		On	the	other	hand,	task-irrelevant	learning	and	task-irrelevant,	or	self-reflection	introduce	extraneous	factors	that	may	negatively	impact	performance	through	influencing	metacognitive	processes	that	drive	motivation,	engagement,	effort	and	sensitivity	to	changing	task	demands	(e.g.		Bouffard,	Boisvert,	Vezeau,	&	Larouche,	1995;	Heslin,	Latham,	&	Vandewalle,	2005;	Pintrich,	2000).	Some	of	these	factors	are	associated	with	stable	personality	traits	that	have	been	directly	linked	with	cognitive	abilities.	We	consider	these	cognition-personality	links	now.	
Personality	and	cognitive	ability	In	a	large	sample	of	2317,	Soubelet	and	Salthouse	(2011)	investigated	cognition-personality	relations	as	a	function	of	specific	cognitive	abilities	(Gf,		Gc,	Memory	and	Speed)	and	age	(18-96).	Focusing	here	on	Gf,	the	highest	observed	association,	as	indicated	by	standardized	regression	coefficients,	was	with	Openness/Intellect	(~	.40).	The	remaining	associations	were	considerably	smaller.	The	associations	with	Extraversion,	Neuroticism,	and	less	reliably,	Agreeableness,	were	statistically	significant	at	around	-.20,		-.15,	and	-.10	(respectively).	Conscientiousness	<	-.10	was	not	associated	with	Gf.	These	are	remarkably	consistent	with	findings	from	an	earlier	meta-analysis	by	Ackerman	and	Heggestad	(1997).		There	have	been	numerous	attempts	to	provide	causal	explanations	for	the	cognition-personality	links	(Ackerman,	1996;	Cattell,	1987;	Zimprich,	Allemand,	&	Dellenbach,	2009).	As	they	have	been	found	to	be	reliably	associated	with	cognitive	performance,	we	focus	on	Openness,	Extraversion	and	Neuroticism,	because	these	three	personality	factors	are	most	reliably	associated	with	cognitive	performance.	
Openness/Intellect:	Investment	of	cognitive	resources	in	learning	and	problem-solving	
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requires	facilitating	personality	traits,	dispositions,	and	interests	to	support	ongoing	engagement	and	motivated	self-regulation	(Ackerman	&	Beier,	2003;	Beier	&	Ackerman,	2001;	Goff	&	Ackerman,	1992).	Building	further	from	such	accounts,	Ziegler,	Danay,	Heene,	Asendorpf,	and	Buhner	(2012)	introduced	the	Openness-Fluid-Crystallized-Intelligence	(OFCI)	process	model.	The	OFCI	model	attempts	to	more	fully	integrate	a	role	of	Openness	in	the	broader	cognitive	developmental	pathway.	They	present	evidence	in	favor	of	the	view	that	people	high	in	Openness	are	more	likely	to	be	attracted	to	more	learning	opportunities	which	positively	affect	Gf;	that	Gf	positively	affects	Openness	because	the	skills	afforded	by	Gf	are	more	likely	to	lead	to	success	in	novel,	complex	situations;	and	consistent	with	Cattell’s	(1987)	Gf-Gc	investment	theory,	Openness	has	an	indirect	effect	on	Gc	via	a	direct	effect	on	Gf;	though	this	is	not	without	controversy	(see	Kan,	Kievit,	Dolan,	&	Van	Der	Maas,	2011).		
Extraversion:	Deyoung,	Peterson,	and	Higgins	(2005)	refer	to	the	“tendency	to	engage	actively	and	flexibly	with	novelty”	as	a	defining	commonalty	between	Extraversion	and	Openness/Intellect.	They	have	linked	Openness	with	a	conative	disposition	toward	novelty	(e.g.,	intellectual	curiosity)	and	Extraversion	as	realizing	this	curiosity	in	actual	exploratory	behaviors.	Positive	associations	between	these	factors	are	not	new.	Building	from	Digman	(1997)	two-factor	models	of	personality,	(e.g.,	Deyoung,	2006)	have	proposed	two-factor	models	of	personality,	where	Extraversion	and	Openness	defined	one	higher-order	plasticity	factor,	and	Neuroticism	(reverse	coded),	Agreeableness	and	Conscientiousness	defined	the	second	stability	factor.	In	spite	of	the	positive	correlation	between	these	factors,	Extraversion	is	negatively	associated	with	cognitive	performance	and	Openness	positively	associated.	The	patterns	of	correlations	are	typically	associated	with		
Neuroticism:	Under	challenging	task	demands,	high	levels	of	Neuroticism	have	been	
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associated	with	negative	affective	responses	including	heightened	stress,	anxiety	and	self-consciousness	(Szymura,	2010).	In	application,	intelligence	tests	are	typically	considered	to	be	high-stakes	and	thus	the	requirement	to	complete	one	has	the	potential	to	be	viewed	by	individuals	as	a	performance	context	(Kozlowski	&	Bell,	2006).	For	some	individuals,	such	contexts	have	been	associated	with	increased	anxiety	(i.e.,	test	anxiety)	and	choking	under	pressure,	and	both	have	been	shown	to	have	deleterious	effects	on	performance	(Smeding,	Darnon,	&	Van	Yperen,	2015).		Moutafi,	Furnham,	and	Tsaousis	(2006)	experimentally	manipulated	the	stakes	of	RPM	performance	(via	whether	performance	was	anonymous	or	not)	and	thus	test	anxiety,	and	found	the	Neuroticism-Intelligence	relationship	to	be	completely	mediated	by	test	anxiety.	Low	levels	of	Neuroticism	have	also	been	associated	with	poor	performance	but	for	different	reasons.	According	to	Szymura,	and	echoing	Eysenck	(1967),	poor	performance	is	in	part	a	result	of	lower	arousal.	This	is	because	low	arousal	is	thought	to	limit	access	to	attentional	resources,	dampen	effort,	and	consequently	lead	to	inadequately	monitoring	the	quality	of	one’s	performance.	Moderate	levels	of	Neuroticism	appear	to	be	most	effective	for	cognitive	performance.	This	non-linear	influence	of	Neuroticism	on	performance	was	described	by	Yerkes–Dodson	(1908)	who	suggested	the	inverted-U	relation	is	due	to	within-person	differences	in	the	subjective	experience	of	arousal	when	dealing	with	cognitive	tasks	of	differing	complexity.	In	a	population	of	individuals	with	moderate	trait	levels	of	Neuroticism,	variations	in	task	demands	are	thought	to	lead	to	variations	in	state	arousal,	that	when	effectively	regulated,	lead	to	optimal	effort	and	resource	allocation,	and	a	positive	association	with	performance	(Beckmann,	Beckmann,	Minbashian,	&	Birney,	2013;	Kahneman,	1973;	Szymura,	2010).		Self-regulation	of	affective	and	cognitive	resources	brings	us	to	the	role	of	metacognition	and	the	impacts	of	being	asked	to	reflect	on	the	correctness	of	one’s	responses.		
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Metacognition	and	Experience	Using	a	self-regulatory,	metacognitive	framework,	one	can	conceptualize	cognitive	abilities	and	personality	factors	driving	effort	and	persistence	through	a	range	of	cognitive	and	affective	reactions	to	variations	in	situational	demands	(Bandura,	1997;	Beckmann,	Wood,	&	Minbashian,	2010;	e.g.,	Kanfer	&	Ackerman,	1989;	Mischel	&	Shoda,	1995).	Planning	and	monitoring	are	common	features	of	self-regulation	theories	regarding	the	allocation	and	deployment	of	cognitive	resources	to	learning	and	performance.	Such	metacognitive	processes	have	been	shown	to	underlie	an	individual’s	evaluation	of	their	belief	in	the	correctness	of	their	responses,	as	operationalized	by	confidence	ratings	(Stankov	&	Lee,	2014).	Although	individual	differences	research	often	considers	confidence	to	be	a	stable	trait-like	factor	that	facilitates	cognitive	performance	(Kleitman	&	Stankov,	2007;	Pallier	et	al.,	2002),	confidence	has	also	been	shown	to	vary	considerably	and	dynamically	from	item-to-item	(Ackerman,	2014).		Confidence	ratings	represent	a	formalized	requirement	for	the	participant	to	reflect	on	their	performance	immediately	after	responding.	This	monitoring	may	have	a	dynamic	effect	on	performance	on	subsequent	items	as	a	test	taker	gains	greater	insight	into	the	effectiveness	of	the	reasoning	strategies	used	in	previous	items,	and	then	uses	this	information	to	inform	approaches	to	later	items.	In	this	way,	self-regulation	facilitates	task-relevant	learning.	Metacognition-focused	interventions	have	been	shown	to	improve	performance	by	prompting	greater	self-assessment	and	reflection	(Azevedo,	2005;	BoulwareGooden,	Carreker,	Thornhill,	&	Joshi,	2007;	Kramarski	&	Mevarech,	2003;	Kuiper,	2002).	However,	there	is	another	possible	outcome	to	consider.	For	some	individuals,	being	required	to	reflect	on	the	correctness	of	one’s	responses	might	trigger	task-irrelevant	processing,	leading	to	anxiety	and	self-doubt,	reduced	self-confidence,	and	maladaptive	behaviors	that	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	self-regulation	and	subsequent	performance	(e.g.		
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Bouffard	et	al.,	1995;	Heslin	et	al.,	2005;	Zimmerman,	2000).	This	is	thought	to	happen,	at	least	in	part,	because	attentional	resources	are	devoted	to	thoughts	unlikely	to	facilitate	learning,	such	as	ruminating	about	others’	evaluation	of	their	performance	(Steele-Johnson,	Beauregard,	Hoover,	&	Schmidt,	2000)	and	the	stakes	of	the	assessment	(Moutafi	et	al.,	2006).	One	would	expect	these	to	be	more	marked	for	those	higher	in	Neuroticism.	
Aims	and	Hypotheses	The	first	goal	of	the	current	study	is	to	investigate	the	personality	correlates	of	item-to-item	performance	and	learning	trajectories	in	the	RPM,	particularly	in	regard	to	Openness	(Ziegler	et	al.,	2012),	Extraversion	(Deyoung	et	al.,	2005)	and	Neuroticism	(Beckmann	et	al.,	2013;	Szymura,	2010).	The	second,	related	aim	is	to	consider	how	metacognitive	reflection,	operationalized	through	the	requirement	to	provide	confidence	ratings,	might	moderate	any	observed	cognition-personality	relations	(Ackerman,	2014).	The	implicit	assumption	in	individual	differences	research	is	that	requiring	confidence	ratings	does	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	performance,	however	there	are	reasons	why	this	may	not	be	the	case	(Mitchum	et	al.,	2016).	Our	explicit	expectation	is	that	given	what	is	known	about	self-regulatory	processes,	the	requirement	to	reflect	on	performance	in	sufficient	detail	to	provide	confidence	ratings	will	facilitate	deeper	metacognitive	processing	and	ultimately	better	performance	(BoulwareGooden	et	al.,	2007;	Kuiper,	2002).	An	alternative	account	would	be	that	confidence	ratings	prime	some	individuals	to	maladaptively	focus	on	task-irrelevant	aspects	of	performance.	This	would	lead	to	a	negative	impact	on	self-regulation,	and	ultimately	a	decline	in	performance	and	learning	outcomes	(e.g.		Bouffard	et	al.,	1995;	Heslin	et	al.,	2005;	Vandewalle,	1997).	In	the	study	presented	here,	we	aim	to	provide	an	alternative	and	broader	approach	to	considering	the	item-position	effect	investigated	by	Schweizer	and	colleagues	(e.g.,	Ren	et	al.,	2014;	Schweizer,	2006).	
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Method	
Participants	The	participants	were	311	mid-level	managers	from	four	large	international	companies	based	in	Australia	who	were	participating	in	a	5-module	leadership	training	and	development	program.	Of	these,	252	participants	(age:	34.51	yrs,	SD	=	6.74yrs;	38%	female)	had	full	data	and	were	included	in	the	analyses.	The	data	analyzed	were	from	77	participants	who	worked	for	a	major	financial	institution,	86	for	an	international	airline,	61	for	an	insurance	company,	and	28	for	a	broadcasting	company.	High	school	was	the	highest	level	of	education	for	12%	of	participants,	44%	had	an	undergraduate	degree,	and	the	remaining	participants	held	higher	degrees	(e.g.,	Masters/PhD).	On	average,	participants	had	spent	2.06	years	(SD	=	1.97)	in	the	current	job	(range	=	0.50	–	10.00;	median	=	1.50	years)	and	had	5.54	years	(SD	=	4.61)	of	management	experience	overall	(range	=	0.5	–	21.00;	median	=	4.00	years).		
Design	A	mixed-level	design	was	employed.	The	between-subjects	factor	was	RPM	administration	format	(with	or	without	item-based	confidence	ratings).	The	within-person	component	entails	item-to-item	performances	across	the	36	RPM	items.	Individual	differences	variables	were	assessed	at	baseline	approximately	6	months	prior	to	the	RPM	administration.	Participants	were	assigned	with	their	cohort	to	complete	the	RPM	either	with	confidence	ratings	(6	cohorts,	N	=	81)	or	in	the	standard	way	without	confidence	ratings	(16	cohorts,	N	=	171)	in	as	balanced	a	way	as	was	possible	within	the	context	of	the	project	(other	aspects	of	the	program	remained	the	same).		
Materials	
Experimental	Task	
Raven’s	Advanced	Progressive	Matrices	-	Set	II		
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Each	of	the	36	RPM	items	consists	of	a	3	by	3	matrix	of	geometric	patterns	with	the	bottom	right	element	missing.		The	task	is	to	identify	the	rule	or	rules	that	govern	the	horizontal	as	well	as	vertical	sequence	of	elements	within	a	matrix	moving,	and	then	to	identify	the	element	that	correctly	completes	the	pattern	from	8	options.		
Standard	Administration:	The	standard	administration	requires	participants	to	complete	as	many	items	as	they	can	within	40mins.	Items	not	reached	were	scored	as	incorrect.	
Confidence	Administration:		A	subset	of	the	sample	completed	confidence	ratings	after	responding	to	each	RPM	item.	Participants	allocated	to	this	condition	were	asked:	“How	confident	are	you	that	your	answer	was	correct?”	Participants	responded	on	a	sliding	0-100	scale	from	“not	at	all	confident”	to	“extremely	confident”.	The	time	to	consider	and	provide	confidence	ratings	for	each	RPM	item	was	not	included	in	the	40min	time	limit.		
Reasoning	Measures		
Verbal	Reasoning	–	VR	(SHL-VMG4)	is	a	48-item	commercially	sourced	test	that	measures	the	ability	to	understand	and	evaluate	the	logic	of	various	verbal	arguments	relevant	to	managerial	work	(www.shl.com).	The	task	was	to	decide	whether	a	statement	made	in	connection	with	the	given	information	was	true,	untrue,	or	whether	there	was	insufficient	information	to	judge	(Cronbach	α	=	.82).		
Numerical	Reasoning	–	NR	(SHL-NMG4)	is	a	35-item	commercially	sourced	test	that	measures	the	ability	to	make	decisions	or	inferences	based	on	numerical	data	and	was	designed	to	apply	to	a	range	of	management	level	jobs	(www.shl.com).	The	task	was	to	interpret	data	and	combine	information	from	different	sources	in	order	to	answer	the	questions	given.	Calculators	were	provided	so	that	the	emphasis	in	this	test	was	on	understanding	and	evaluation	rather	than	on	computation	(Cronbach	α	=	.91).		
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Abstract	Reasoning	–	AR	(SHL-DC3.1)	is	a	40-item	commercially	sourced	test	that	measures	the	ability	to	reason	with	abstract	figures	and	requires	the	recognition	and	application	of	logical	rules	governing	sequence	changes	(www.shl.com).	The	abstract	reasoning	test	consisted	of	a	series	of	diagrammatic	sequences.	The	task	was	to	identify	the	underlying	structure	of	this	sequence,	and	select	the	figure	that	best	completed	the	pattern	(Cronbach	α	=	.85).		
SHL	Reasoning	Ability:	Principal	components	analysis	of	SHL	reasoning	measures	was	used	to	derive	a	single	measure.	The	principal	component	captured	64.71%	of	the	common	variance	in	SHL	test	scores.	Component	loadings	were	VR	=	.768,	NR	=	.878,	and	AR	=	.762.		
Personality	measures	The	Big-Five	personality	items	were	assessed	using	Goldberg’s	50-item	self-report	version	(IPIP,	see	http://ipip.ori.org/ipip),	which	has	10	items	for	each	factor	scored	on	0-100	scale	anchored	by	the	labels	“very	inaccurate”	to	“very	accurate”.	Openness	(Cronbach	α	=	.78)	reflects	a	continuum	of	appreciation	for	intellect	and	novelty	of	experience;	Conscientiousness	(Cronbach	α	=	.87)	reflects	a	continuum	of	orderliness,	self-discipline,	and	control;	Extraversion	(Cronbach	α	=	.88)	reflects	an	engagement	with	the	external	world	vs	independence	of	the	social	world;	
Agreeableness	(Cronbach	α	=	.76)	reflects	trusting,	generosity	vs	skeptical,	self-interest;	and	
Neuroticism	(Cronbach	α	=	.85)	reflects	negative	reactivity	vs	emotional	stability.	
Procedure	Participants	completed	the	assessments	as	part	of	a	5-module	leadership	training	program	conducted	over	2	years	(see	Appendix	1).	SHL	reasoning	tests	and	other	measures	were	administered	in	Module	1,	the	RPM	was	administered	in	Module	2	about	6	months	later.	All	tests	were	administered	via	computer	and	all	sessions	were	proctored	by	trained	researchers.		
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Results		
Preliminary	Checks	As	described	previously,	it	was	not	possible	to	allocate	participating	industry	managers	to	conditions	completely	at	random.		Differences	at	baseline	in	5	of	the	9	variables	were	observed	(see	Table	A2,	Appendix	2).	Relative	to	the	Standard	group,	the	Confidence	group	scored	significantly	higher	on	SHL	Verbal	and	Numerical	Reasoning,	Agreeableness	and	Openness,	and	were	lower	in	Neuroticism	(all	ps	<	.05).	There	were	no	significant	differences	between	the	groups	in	terms	of	SHL	Abstract	Reasoning	(the	ability	closest	in	form	to	RPM),	age,	gender,	employment	experience,	Extraversion,	and	Conscientiousness.	Differences	are	considered	to	be	a	function	of	the	companies	participants	came	from	and	the	cohorts	that	their	HR	managers	allocated	them	to1.	Given	we	are	investigating	performance	on	the	RPM,	the	prototypical	indicator	of	Gf,	we	explored	the	extent	to	which	the	relationship	between	SHL	reasoning	ability	(latent	factor	from	the	3	SHL	tests)	and	each	of	the	5	personality	measures	for	each	of	the	22	cohorts	differed	by	group	(with/without	confidence	ratings).	There	were	no	significant	differences	observed	across	groups	(.174	<	ps	<	.938).		
Overview	of	Analyses	The	main	analyses	are	reported	in	two	sections.	Section	1	describes	the	derivation	of	calibrated	item-level	difficulty	parameters	which	serve	as	the	basis	of	the	trajectory	analyses	of	Section	2.	Section	2	provides	a	simultaneous	analysis	of	the	item-by-item	performance	and	learning	trajectories	as	a	function	of	the	moderators	and	experimental	condition.	Using	a	multi-level-modeling	approach,	we	consider	each	moderator	separately	with	its	respective	group																																																									
1	Although	we	requested	that	companies	provide	a	broad	range	of	employees	to	participate	in	the	program,	ultimately	the	researchers	had	little	control	over	the	final	cohort	provided.		
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interaction	after	controlling	for	SHL	reasoning	ability	(general	cognitive	ability).	For	completeness,	an	additional	set	of	analogous	moderator	analyses	considers	actual	confidence	ratings	provided	by	the	participants.	
Section	1:	Item	Calibration	Analyses	The	progressive	increase	of	RPM	item	complexity	associated	with	the	administration	order	introduces	a	confound	when	estimating	item-difficulty.	To	deal	with	this	our	analytic	framework	considers	both	item-difficulty	and	item-order.	This	is	important	statistically	(to	address	the	confound)	but	also	important	conceptually	in	terms	of	moderation	effects	(psychometric	complexity	and	learning).	Item-difficulty	was	calibrated	using	the	Rasch	measurement	model	as	implemented	in	Winsteps	(Linacre,	2012);	the	scale	of	the	metric	was	specified	to	UMEAN=0	and	USCALE=1.	With	appropriate	fit,	item-difficulty	parameters	are	considered	to	be	scale-free	estimates	independent	of	the	sample	on	which	they	are	based	(Perline,	Wright,	&	Wainer,	1979).	Item	fit	to	the	Rasch	model	was	satisfactory,	as	might	be	expected	from	an	extensively	validated	assessment	(Model	Item	parameters:	RMSE	=	.194,	mean	=	0.00,	SD	=	1.872,	reliability	=	.99,	
separation	=	9.59,	infit	mean	=	0.98,	SD	=	0.09,	min	=	0.82,	max	=	1.29).	All	items	were	within	acceptable	fit	ranges	(infit	mean	square	>	0.60	and	<	1.40).		Analysis	of	person	fit,	however,	indicated	a	relatively	high	proportion	of	misfit	in	the	measurement	of	person	ability	(11.64%	of	participants	having	infit	values	>	1.40),	suggesting	item	response	patterns	inconsistent	with	the	Rasch	measurement	model	(Model	Person	parameters:	
RMSE	=	.476,	mean	=	0.889,	SD	=	1.12,	reliability	=	.82,	separation	=	2.13,	infit	mean	=	0.99,	SD	=																																																									
2	We	note	that	this	is	relatively	large	given	USCALE	(SD)	was	set	to	1.	Reanalysis	of	previously	published	RPM	data	(Birney	&	Bowman,	2009)	using	the	same	specifications	showed	similar	fit	in	a	sample	of	175	university	students	(Item	
parameters:	RMSE	=	.242,	mean	=	0.00,	SD	=	1.78,	reliability	=	.98,	separation	=	7.26,	infit	mean	=	0.99,	SD	=	0.	10,	min	=	0.84,	max	=	1.27),	thus	we	suspect	this	to	be	a	function	of	the	RPM,	not	this	sample	per	se.	
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0.30,	min	=	0.41,	max	=	2.04).	An	analysis	of	differential	item	functioning	across	condition	indicated	that	only	2	of	the	36	items	had	statistically	significant	DIF	–	items	33	and	34	were	significantly	more	difficult	when	presented	with	confidence	ratings	than	without,	ps	<	.05.	Exploring	this	further	in	terms	of	differential	test	functioning	(DTF),	a	comparison	of	the	observed	empirical	relationship	between	item	estimates	in	the	two	conditions	and	the	identity	relationship	(which	assumes	no	differences	between	conditions)	revealed	that	the	observed	empirical	slope	is	not	significantly	different	from	the	identity	slope,	t34	=	0.58,	p	=	.282.	As	such,	we	can	surmise	that	because	significant	DIF	is	present	in	only	2	of	the	36	items	and	that	DTF	is	not	significant,	it	is	likely	that	being	required	to	make	confidence	ratings	is	probably	not	responsible	for	person	misfit.	While	it	is	also	possibly	the	case	that	confidence	ratings	are	not	having	an	overall	differential	effect	on	mean	test	performance,	we	note	that	given	the	confidence	group	did	demonstrate	statistically	higher	SHL	reasoning	ability,	they	may	have	under-performed	on	the	RPM.	A	linear	regression	analysis	suggests	this	to	be	the	case.	When	SHL	reasoning	ability	was	controlled	for,	there	was	a	significant	group	difference	in	the	Rasch	calibrated	RPM	score,	with	the	Confidence	group	performing	more	poorly	(standardized	β	=	-0.13,	t(248)	=	-2.64,	p	=	.009).	This	is	a	difference	of	approximately	1.35	items.		
Section	2:	Trajectory	Analyses.	The	following	MLM	analyses	were	conducted	using	HLM	7	(Raudenbush,	Bryk,	&	Congdon,	2011).	An	analysis	of	the	variability	at	each	level	(unconditional	model)	indicated	that	93.6%	of	the	variability	in	the	data	occurs	at	level	2	(between	persons)	and	6.4%	at	level	1	(within	person;	or	equivalently,	differences	between	items).	Item-based	RPM	performance	is	a	binary	variable	(accuracy	=	0/1),	and	therefore	the	appropriate	underlying	model	is	a	logistic	one.	Item-level	variables	entered	at	level	1	were	item-order	(centered;	-17	to	17),	item	difficulty	(Rasch	scaled	
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estimates	from	Section	1;	mean	=	0),	and	for	those	in	the	Confidence	group,	confidence	ratings	(0-100;	person-centered).	The	individual	differences	variables	(grand-mean	centered)	and	experimental	group	are	considered	at	level	2.		Model	1	is	represented	in	Table	1.	The	objective	of	Model	1	is	to	simultaneously	consider	the	association	between	performance	and	item-difficulty	(as	calibrated	in	the	Rasch	analysis	of	Section	1)	controlling	for	item-order,	and	the	association	between	performance	and	item-order	controlling	for	item-difficulty.	Inclusion	of	the	moderators	and	confidence	rating	group	at	level	2	provides	tests	of	cross-level	interactions	with	the	level	1	parameter	estimates	–	mean	RPM	performance	(intercept),	item-difficulty	performance	trajectories	(item-difficulty	slopes),	and	item-order	performance	trajectories	(item-order	slopes).	Together,	this	analysis	tests	whether	mean	RPM	performance	and	trajectories	differ	as	a	function	of	1)	specific	personality	factors,	2)	which	group	participants	are	in	(i.e.,	with	or	without	confidence	ratings),	and	3)	whether	there	is	a	higher-order	interaction	effect	between	personality	and	group	on	performance.	Because	of	the	significant	differences	between	groups	at	the	outset	in	reasoning	ability,	and	because	we	are	interested	in	the	incremental	prediction	of	personality	factors	beyond	cognition,	SHL	reasoning	ability	is	included	as	a	covariate	in	all	models.		
Table	1.	MLM	model	of	the	moderator	analysis	of	RPM	performance	(Model	1).	
Level	1:	Prob(Yti	=1	|	πi	)	=	ϕti		Log[ϕti	/	(1	-	ϕti)]	=	ηti			ηti	=	π0i	+	π1i.DIFFICULTYti	+	π2i.ORDERti		
	
Level	2:	π0i		=	β00	+	β01.SHL	+	β02.group	+	β03.IV	+	β04.IV.group	+	r0i	π1i		=	β10	+	β11.group	+	β12.IV	+	β13.IV.group	+	r1i	π2i		=	β20	+	β21.group	+	β22.IV	+	β23.IV.group	
	Where	Y	=	RPM	Accuracy	(0/1)	for	individual	i,	at	item	t;	DIFFICULTY	=	Rasch	calibrated	difficulty;	ORDER	=	centered	item	order	(-17	to	17);	Group:	0	=	Standard,	1	=	Confidence;	SHL	=	SHL	reasoning	ability;	IV	=	moderating	independent	variable	(SHL,	Openness,	Extraversion,	Neuroticism,	Agreeableness,	Conscientiousness)		 	
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Before	reporting	the	results	of	these	moderator	analyses,	we	wish	to	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	a	relatively	large	number	of	main-effects	and	cross-level	interaction	effects	are	considered.	It	is	thus	prudent	to	reflect	on	the	implication	of	this	in	terms	of	power	and	alpha	inflation	for	the	families	of	comparisons.	The	MLM	approach	is	distinctly	advantageous	in	this	regard	(Gelman,	Hill,	&	Yajima,	2012)	compared	to	OLS	regression	(Brunner	&	Austin,	2009).	MLM	uses	a	partial	pooling	process	(often	referred	to	as	“shrinkage”)	that	serves	to	shift	parameter	estimates	and	their	associated	standard	errors	toward	mean	coefficients	in	the	complete	data.	This	processes	has	the	desirable	effect	of	shrinking	coefficients	that	are	estimated	with	small	accuracy	more	so	than	those	estimated	with	higher	accuracy	(Hox,	2010),	thus	intervals	for	comparisons	are	more	likely	to	include	zero	(Gelman	et	al.).		While	the	MLM	approach	produces	conservative	estimates	that	are	more	likely	to	be	valid	(see	Gelman,	et	al.,	2012,	and	Hox,	2010,	for	more	detailed	discussion),	we	take	the	following	additional	steps	to	strengthen	our	confidence	in	the	results.	First,	the	effects	reported	are	after	controlling	for	appropriate	covariates	(a	common	strategy	to	increase	power).	Second,	follow-up	simple-slopes	analyses	are	only	considered	when	a	moderation	effect	is	significant.	Finally,	we	point	out	for	the	interested	reader	that	if	we	had	not	used	an	MLM	approach,	the	critical	value	(for	results	reported	in	Table	A3)	for	a	standard	Bonferroni-adjusted	family-wise	error	rate	is	t	=	2.50,	p	=	.013	(with	k=4	family-wise	comparisons	each	for	analyses	of	the	intercept,	and	item-difficulty	and	item-order	slopes).	
Moderator	Analyses	The	first	variant	of	Model	1	tested	the	reduced	base	model	and	included	only	SHL	reasoning	ability	and	Group.	It	serves	as	a	comparison	to	subsequent	models	(i.e.,	no	IV	moderator	was	included).	SHL	reasoning	ability	(β	=	0.646,	t245	=	13.65,	p	<	.001)	and	Group	(β	=	-.261,	t245	=	-2.62,	
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p	=	.009)	were	significant	predictors	of	mean	RPM	performance	(Deviance	=	24182.58;	Number	of	parameters	=	8).	The	base	model	is	reported	in	Table	A3.	Six	separate	analyses	based	on	Model	1	were	then	run,	one	for	each	of	the	moderators	(SHL	reasoning	ability	and	the	five	personality	factors).	Full	details	of	these	analyses	are	reported	in	Appendix	3,	including	95%	confidence	intervals	on	the	odds-ratio	estimates.	Cross-level	interaction	plots	and	simple-slopes	analyses	are	provide	to	support	interpretation	of	the	significant	moderated	associations.	Controlling	for	SHL	reasoning	ability	on	mean	RPM	performance,	the	addition	of	Group	with	each	of	the	personality	factors	in	separate	analyses	all	resulted	in	significant	model	improvement	(as	indicated	by	significant	changes	in	Deviance	estimates	relative	to	the	base	model,	see	Table	A3).	Significant	moderation	was	observed	for	Openness,	Neuroticism,	and	not	for	Conscientiousness,	as	expected.	Counter	to	expectations,	significant	moderation	was	observed	for	Agreeableness,	but	not	for	SHL	Reasoning	ability	or	Extraversion.		
SHL	Reasoning	Ability:	The	Model	1	analysis	with	SHL	reasoning	ability	as	the	moderator	revealed	that	neither	item-difficulty	nor	item-order	trajectories	were	associated	with	SHL	Reasoning	ability.	As	such,	there	is	no	evidence	of	statistical	moderation	in	terms	of	a	change	in	the	association	between	performance	and	cognitive	ability	as	a	function	of	item-difficulty	(what	Birney	and	Bowman,	2009,	referred	to	as	psychometric	complexity),	and	no	analogous	item-order	moderation.	
Openness:	The	Openness	factor	was	a	significant	predictor	of	mean	RPM	score	(β	=	0.009,	
t243	=	2.45,	p	=	.015),	but	did	not	statistically	moderate	the	item-difficulty	trajectory.	When	Openness	was	controlled	for,	there	were	significant	group	differences	in	the	item-order	trajectory	(β	=	-0.039,	t8428	=	-1.98,	p	=	.047).	Thus,	while	there	was	no	direct	evidence	for	a	moderating	
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association	between	Openness	and	RPM	performance	trajectories,	there	was	an	indirect	association.	Test	takers	in	the	standard	administration	group	had	a	more	positive	association	with	performance	as	a	function	of	item-order	than	those	who	were	required	to	provide	confidence	ratings	(Figure	1).		
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure	1.	Moderation	of	item-order	trajectory,	controlling	for	Openness,	for	the	RPM	standard	administration	(standard)	and	RPM	administration	with	confidence	ratings	(confidence).		
Neuroticism:	Group	membership	statistically	moderated	the	association	between	mean	RPM	score	and	Neuroticism	(β	=	0.015,	t243	=	2.27,	p	=	.024).	After	controlling	for	SHL	Reasoning	Ability,	Neuroticism	was	more	positively,	and	according	to	simple-slopes	analyses	(β	=	0.014,	t75	=	2.48,	p	=	.015),	significantly	associated	with	mean	RPM	performance	in	the	confidence	group	than	in	the	standard	group.	Simple-slopes	analyses	revealed	that	Neuroticism	did	not	predict	mean	RPM	performance	in	the	standard	group	(β	=	0.001,	t75	=	-0.165,	p	=	.869).	Neuroticism	also	statistically	moderated	item-difficulty	and	item-order	trajectories	(Figure	4A).	Higher	Neuroticism	was	associated	with	less	pronounced	decline	in	item-difficulty	trajectories	(β	=	0.007,	t244	=	2.36,	p	=	.019),	and	a	more	pronounced	decline	in	item-order	trajectories	(β	=	-0.002,	t8428	=	-2.67,	p	=	.008).	This	is	consistent	with	an	interpretation	that	the	impact	of	item-difficulty	on	performance	was	less	marked	for	those	higher	in	Neuroticism	(Figure	2A),	and	that	the	impact	of	item-order	was	more	marked	for	those	lower	in	Neuroticism	(Figure	2B).		
Insert Figure 2A here Insert Figure 2B 
Figure	2.	Moderation	of	RPM	item-difficulty	(A)	and	item-order	(B)	trajectories	by	Neuroticism	(±	1.5sd)				
Agreeableness:	Given	Agreeableness	has	consistently	been	shown	to	have	little	to	no	association	with	cognition,	no	specific	predictions	were	made.	However,	in	the	current	data,	statistically	significant	associations	were	observed,	although	these	emerged	only	as	part	of	the	group	moderation	analysis.	Group	(standard	vs.	confidence)	statistically	moderated	the	
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association	between	mean	RPM	score	and	Agreeableness	(β	=	-0.015,	t243	=	-2.06,	p	=	.040).	After	controlling	for	SHL	reasoning	ability,	Agreeableness	was	more	negatively,	and	according	to	simple-slopes	analyses	(β	=	-0.015,	t75	=	-2.455,	p	=	.017),	significantly	associated	with	mean	RPM	performance	when	confidence	ratings	were	required.	There	was	no	significant	association	between	Agreeableness	and	mean	RPM	performance	under	standard	conditions	(simple-slopes	analysis:	β	=	0.004,	t167	=	0.933,	p	=	.352).	Group	membership	also	moderated	the	association	between	Agreeableness	and	item-difficulty	trajectories	(β	=	0.021,	t244	=	2.07,	p	=	.039).	Higher	Agreeableness	was	associated	with	a	more	pronounced	positive	association	with	item-difficulty	trajectories	in	the	confidence	group	(Figure	3A),	than	in	the	standard	group	(Figure	3B).	The	simple-slopes	analyses	for	each	group	indicated	that	while	the	associations	were	in	the	opposite	directions	(as	can	be	observed	in	the	plots),	neither	was	statistically	significant	in	its	own	right.	Stated	differently,	higher	agreeableness	was	associated	with	a	more	pronounced	decline	in	performance	as	a	function	of	item	difficulty	under	standard	conditions,	than	under	confidence	conditions.	Thus	there	is	evidence	for	an	association	between	psychometric	complexity	and	Agreeableness	but	its	nature	is	statistically	weak	and	qualitatively	differs	depending	on	whether	confidence	ratings	were	required.	
Insert Figure 3A here Insert Figure 3B here 
Figure	3.	Moderation	of	item-difficulty	trajectory	by	Agreeableness	(±	1.5sd)	in	Standard	(A)	and	Confidence	(B)	groups		
	
Conscientiousness	and	Extraversion:	There	were	no	significant	unique	incremental	associations	(main-effects	or	item	trajectories)	observed	for	Conscientiousness	and	Extraversion.	Thus,	contrary	to	expectations,	Extraversion	did	not	predict	mean	RPM	performance,	did	not	statistically	moderate	item-difficulty	or	item-order	trajectories,	and	there	were	no	significant	
BEYOND	THE	INTELLECT		23	
interactions	with	group.	Similarly,	when	Conscientiousness	was	included,	no	statistical	moderation	was	observed	and	group	differences	were	no	longer	uniquely	significant	(see	Table	A3).	
Alignment	between	confidence	and	performance		So	far	we	have	considered	metacognition	in	terms	of	between-group	differences	in	being	required	to	provide	confidence	ratings	or	not.	It	is	of	further	interest	to	investigate	whether	the	confidence	ratings	themselves	moderate	the	cognitive-personality	associations	with	RPM	means	and	item	trajectories.	The	Model	1	analyses	were	repeated	with	the	addition	of	item-level	confidence-ratings	person-centered	at	level	1	with	the	N	=	80	participants	who	provided	confidence	ratings.	When	confidence	is	centered	at	the	level	of	the	individual,	the	accuracy-confidence	slope	defines	the	degree	of	metacognitive	alignment	taking	into	consideration	individual	differences	in	use	of	the	100-point	scale.	That	is,	mean	confidence	is	relative	to	the	individual	rather	than	the	whole	sample.	The	analyses	indicated	that	overall,	the	relationship	between	confidence	and	performance	was	positive	and	significant	(β	=	0.031364,	t77	=	11.606,	p	<	0.0001)	suggesting	that	test	takers	have	overall	a	realistic	appreciation	of	their	performance	level.	Reasoning	ability	as	measured	via	SHL	was	not	associated	with	accuracy-confidence	alignment	(i.e.,	not	supporting	a	Dunning-Kruger	effect).	The	only	personality	factor	associated	with	accuracy-confidence	alignment	was	Extraversion	(Figure	4).	Higher	Extraversion	was	associated	with	lower	alignment	(β	=	-0.0003,	t76	=	-2.19,	p	=	.032).	No	other	significant	associations	with	RPM	performance	were	observed.	
Insert Figure 4 here 
Figure	4.		Alignment	(association	between	confidence	rating	and	accuracy)	interaction	with	Extraversion			 For	completeness,	a	final	set	of	analyses	was	conducted	regressing	SHL	reasoning	ability	and	each	personality	factor	separately	on	the	actual	confidence	rating	(i.e.,	with	confidence	rating	
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as	the	dependent	variable).	Item	accuracy	(β	=	18.60,	t76	=	10.40,	p	<	.001),	item	difficulty	trajectories	(β	=	-3.86,	t76	=	-6.53,	p	<	.001),	and	item-order	trajectories	(β	=	-0.41,	t76	=	-4.26,	p	<	.001)	were	all	significantly	associated	with	item	confidence.	However,	neither	SHL	reasoning	ability	nor	any	of	the	personality	variables	significantly	predicted	mean	confidence,	nor	did	they	predict	item-difficulty	and	item-order	confidence	trajectories.	Thus	whilst	there	is	some	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	requirement	to	provide	confidence	ratings	has	some	association	with	performance,	and	that	this	is	statistically	moderated	by	personality	traits,	the	actual	confidence	ratings	provided	seem	to	be	unrelated	with	these	same	traits.	
Discussion	In	the	current	work	we	conceptualize	an	interplay	between	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	factors	that	goes	beyond	total	test	scores.	Although	personality	and	metacognitive	factors	have	consistently	been	observed	to	be	associated	with	intellectual	performance	(Ackerman	&	Heggestad,	1997;	Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011),	there	is	little	research	into	their	associations	with	item-to-item	performance	trajectories	in	cognitive	tasks.	Our	manipulation	to	require	confidence	ratings	in	a	sub-sample	of	the	participants	served	two	purposes.	First,	it	allowed	us	to	evaluate	whether	confidence	ratings	would	have	an	impact	on	RPM	performance	and	item-to-item	trajectories,	and	second,	by	requiring	participants	to	externalize	metacognitive	processing,	we	emulated	a	situation	that	brought	self-regulatory	processes	to	the	fore.		Our	findings	are	summarized	in	two	parts.	First	conceptually,	in	terms	of	cognitive-personality	associations	with	performance,	and	the	influence	metacognitive	reflection	has	on	these	associations.	And	second	methodologically,	in	terms	of	the	implications	of	considering	moderation	of	individual	differences	in	within-task	performance	trajectories,	which	we	conceptualize	as	psychometric	complexity	(ψC)	and	psychometric	learning	(ψL).		
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Cognition-Personality	moderation	Based	on	prior	cognition-personality	research,	we	expected	three	of	the	five	personality	factors	to	be	related	to	overall	mean	and	item-to-item	RPM	performances:	(1)	Openness,	because	it	is	most	commonly	found	to	be	associated	with	cognition	(Ackerman	&	Heggestad,	1997;	Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011),	and	recent	research	has	formalized	developmental	pathways	between	Openness,	Gf	and	Gc	(Ziegler	et	al.,	2012).	(2)	Extraversion,	because	it	has	been	thought	to	drive	actualization	of	the	Openness	disposition	(Deyoung	et	al.,	2005),	and	(3)	Neuroticism,	because	of	its	role	in	arousal-based	theories	of	attention	(Kahneman,	1973;	Szymura,	2010)	and	test	anxiety	(Moutafi	et	al.,	2006;	Smeding	et	al.,	2015).	We	did	not	expect	to	find	consistent	cognition-personality	associations	with	Agreeableness	and	Conscientiousness.		In	our	study,	Openness	was	related	to	overall	performance	as	expected	from	prior	research	(Ackerman	&	Heggestad,	1997;	Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011),	but	there	was	no	evidence	that	Openness	statistically	moderated	item-difficulty	or	item-order	trajectories	directly.	Neuroticism	was	found	to	be	important	for	mean	RPM	performance.	Overall,	higher	levels	of	Neuroticism	were	associated	with	higher	mean	RPM	performance	in	the	group	that	was	encouraged	to	metacognitively	reflect	on	their	performance	via	confidence	ratings,	but	not	in	the	standard	group.	Neuroticism	also	statistically	moderated	item-to-item	trajectories.	These	associations	did	not	differ	depending	on	whether	confidence	ratings	were	required	or	not.	After	controlling	for	item-order,	higher	levels	of	Neuroticism	were	associated	with	better	performance	overall	as	items	became	more	difficult.	Simultaneously	controlling	for	item-difficulty,	higher	levels	of	Neuroticism	were	associated	with	lower	levels	of	performance	as	the	test	progressed	(i.e.,	by	item	order).	These	opposing	associations	are	somewhat	counter-intuitive.	One	might	reasonably	speculate	from	this	data,	that	Neuroticism	supports	performance	as	items	become	more	difficult,	but	impedes	learning	
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as	one	progresses	through	the	test.	This	is	potentially	consistent	with	the	dual	competing	actions	account	of	Neuroticism	–	as	simultaneously	a	propensity	for	arousal,	that	at	moderate	levels	facilitates	performance	(Beckmann	et	al.,	2013;	Kahneman,	1973;	Szymura,	2010),	and	for	anxiety	(i.e.,	worry	and	test	anxiety,	e.g.,	Moutafi	et	al.,	2006).	That	is,	sufficient	arousal	is	necessary	to	ensure	task	focus,	engagement,	and	performance.	Worry	and	anxiety	on	the	other	hand	is	associated	with	task-irrelevant	processing	that	can	impede	learning,	operationalized	here	as	item-order	trajectories	after	controlling	for	item-difficulty.	That	Neuroticism	may	be	associated	simultaneously	with	facilitation	of	performance	and	impeding	learning	has	important	implications	for	our	understanding	of	intellectual	functioning.	The	associations	between	mean	RPM	performance	and	item-difficulty	trajectories	were	statistically	moderated	by	Agreeableness.	Higher	Agreeableness	was	associated	with	a	more	pronounced	decline	in	performance	as	a	function	of	item	difficulty	under	standard	conditions,	than	under	confidence	conditions.	In	fact	the	nature	of	the	association	was	diametrically	opposed	in	the	two	groups	(i.e.,	interaction).	We	conclude	that	there	is	some	evidence	for	Agreeableness	to	be	associated	with	RPM	performance	trajectories	albeit	statistically	weak	and	qualitatively	shifting	depending	on	whether	confidence	ratings	were	required.	However,	based	on	low	and	inconsistent	effect	sizes	observed	in	previous	literature	(Ackerman	&	Heggestad,	1997;	Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011),	we	made	no	predictions	as	to	the	cognition-Agreeableness	association,	and	therefore	do	not	speculate	further	on	the	basis	of	these	statistical	effects,	other	than	to	note	them	for	future	research.		Finally,	contrary	to	expectations,	Extraversion	did	not	statistically	moderate	mean	RPM	performance.	In	the	supplementary	analyses	that	included	actual	confidence	ratings	at	level	1,	higher	Extraversion	was	significantly	(though	weakly)	associated	with	poorer	alignment	between	
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item	confidence	and	accuracy.	Again,	as	we	made	no	specific	predictions	for	such	associations,	we	do	not	speculate	further,	other	than	to	note	this	as	an	area	for	future	investigations.		
Metacognition		Metacognition	is	a	critical	component	of	self-regulation	and	has	been	considered	as	a	bridge	linking	intellectual	abilities	and	personality	(Stankov,	1999).	Using	a	self-regulatory	framework,	one	can	conceptualize	cognitive	abilities	and	personality	factors	driving	effort	and	persistence	through	a	range	of	cognitive	and	affective	reactions	to	variations	in	situational	demands	(Bandura,	1997;	Beckmann	et	al.,	2010;	Mischel	&	Shoda,	1995).	The	increase	in	item	complexity	can	be	seen	as	a	situational	change.	In	the	current	research	we	went	beyond	the	analysis	of	the	cognition-personality	link	that	is	based	on	the	total	performance	score.	We	were	interested	in	whether	and	how	the	processes	triggered	by	this	situational	change	in	demand	is	reflected	in	how	item-to-item	trajectories	of	experience	are	associated	with	performance	outcomes.	Of	particular	interest	was	whether	requiring	participants	to	externalize	their	metacognitive	processing	by	asking	them	to	reflect	and	report	on	their	confidence	in	the	correctness	of	their	responses	to	each	of	the	36	RPM	items,	would	accentuate	or	attenuate	the	cognition-personality	associations.	Two	accounts	were	proposed.	The	first	suggests	that	reflecting	on	one’s	processing	facilitates	performance	(BoulwareGooden	et	al.,	2007;	Kuiper,	2002).	The	second	suggests	that	for	some	test	takers,	the	same	reflection	leads	to	maladaptive	behaviors	and	consequentially	poorer	performance	(e.g.		Bouffard	et	al.,	1995;	Heslin	et	al.,	2005;	Vandewalle,	1997).	Group	membership	(metacognition	experimentally	encouraged	vs.	not	encouraged)	was	shown	to	have	a	statistically	significant	effect	across	several	of	the	associations	observed.	First,	there	were	group	differences	in	overall	RPM	performance.	Controlling	for	SHL	reasoning	ability	
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(i.e.,	latent	general	cognitive	ability),	those	required	to	provide	confidence	ratings	had	significantly	lower	RPM	scores.	From	this	perspective,	it	would	seem	that	(1)	performance	is	not	immune	to	confidence	ratings,	and	(2)	that	the	facilitating	effect	of	self-reflection	reported	in	other	work	cannot	claim	generality.	Strictly	speaking,	the	methodology	employed	in	this	study	(i.e.,	a	mixture	of	experimental	and	quasi-experimental	design)	does	not	support	strong	causal	claims.	We	will	however	note	possible	avenues	of	future	research	more	suitable	to	identifying	mechanism	that	underpin	the	cognition-personality	link	and	its	impact	on	performance.			Neuroticism,	because	of	its	associations	at	all	levels	of	analyses	in	our	data,	is	the	strongest	candidate	for	further	investigations.	We	earlier	alluded	to	both	facilitating	arousal	and	impeding	anxiety	explanations	as	a	plausible	mechanism	for	the	observed	associations.	Such	conceptual	suppositions	do	have	some	empirical	support	(e.g.,	Moutafi	et	al.,	2006),	but	further	experimental	research	is	needed.	We	are	of	the	view	that	investigations	into	distinctions	between	state	and	trait	Neuroticism	(Beckmann	et	al.,	2013),	possibly	using	confidence	ratings	as	an	experimental	catalyst,	may	prove	particularly	fruitful	in	this	regard.		
Methodological	Issues	The	multi-level	models	investigated	three	levels	of	effects	simultaneously	–	mean	RPM	performance,	the	incremental	statistical	moderators	of	item-difficulty	trajectories,	and	the	incremental	statistical	moderators	of	item-order	trajectories.	These	models	are	comparable	to	the	fixed-links	model	discussed	by	Schweizer	and	his	colleagues	(Ren	et	al.,	2012;	Schweizer,	2006;	Schweizer,	Altmeyer,	Ren,	&	Schreiner,	2015;	Wang,	Ren,	Altmeyer,	&	Schweizer,	2013),	and	both	are	consistent	with	the	general	class	of	SEM	latent	variable	models	of	multilevel	data	(Muthen,	1997).	The	main	overarching	difference	is	that	we	model	item	responses	using	a	multi-level	logistic	regression,	whereas	Schweizer	models	item-clusters	using	a	more	standard	SEM	
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implementation.	In	our	MLM	model,	the	mean	item-difficulty	trajectory	(see	Table	1,	π1i)	is	analogous	to	the	latent	ability	factor	in	Schweizer	(2006).	Instead	of	item	clusters	being	weighted/constrained	to	be	equal,	we	weight/constrain	each	item	by	its	empirical	difficulty	derived	from	the	IRT	calibration	analyses3.		The	item-order	trajectory	(Table	1,	π2i)	is	comparable	to	Schweizer’s	item-position	latent	factor,	where	each	item	is	weighted	by	its	linear	position	in	the	test.	Schweizer	(2006)	has	also	used	other	link	functions	(e.g.,	quadratic	functions).	Finally,	the	intercept	in	the	fixed	link	model	is	comparable	to	the	overall	intercept	in	the	MLM	model	(Table	1,	π0i),	what	is	in	effect	the	mean	RPM	score	parameter.	The	final	difference	is	in	how	we	attempt	to	understand	the	latent	factors.	Schweizer	and	his	colleagues	(e.g.,	Ren	et	al.,	2012;	Schweizer,	2006;	Schweizer	et	al.,	2015;	Wang	et	al.,	2013)	have	explored	fixed-links	models	to	partition	variance	in	numerous	cognitive	functions	(e.g.,	attention,	WM,	and	learning),	whereas	we	have	simultaneously	explored	general	reasoning	ability	(as	a	covariate)	and	moderating	factors	in	the	personality	realm,	while	also	introducing	an	experimental	catalyst	to	prime	self-reflection,	which	in	practice	seems	to	have	accentuated	associations.	It	is	interesting	to	note,	that	in	our	data,	item-order	effects	did	not	emerge	alone	as	in	Schweizer’s	work,	but	were	only	present	in	association	with	personality	moderators.	Thus	we	were	unable	to	fully	replicate	Schweizer’s	item-position	effects	in	our	cohort	of	senior	managers.	It	is	also	important	to	be	cognizant	of	the	fact	that	the	amount	of	systematic	within-subject,	item-to-item	variability	relative	to	between-subject	variability	in	performance	on	RPM	items	is	small	–	6.4%	in	total.	This	is	consistent	with	what	other	researchers	have	reported	(Ren	et	al.,																																																									
3	Although	defined	empirically	here,	item	difficulty	in	RPM	is	concordant	with	theoretical	(albeit	posthoc)	analyses	of	item	induction/WM	demand	(Carpenter	et	al.,	1990).		
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2014)	and	unsurprising	given	the	extensive	between-subject	validation	data	that	exists	for	the	RPM.	Item-difficulty	is	closely	associated	with	item-order	in	the	RPM	(r	=	.95),	yet	the	additional	information	provided	by	item-difficulty	over	and	above	item-order	provides	a	statistically	significant	systematic	contribution	to	the	explained	variability	in	item	performance.		
Psychometric	Complexity	and	Psychometric	Learning	The	progressive	increase	of	difficulty	associated	with	a	standard	RPM	administration	order	introduces	a	confound	when	estimating	item-difficulty.	To	resolve	the	item	order-difficulty	confound	(at	least	in	part),	our	analytic	framework	considers	both	item-difficulty	and	item-order	simultaneously	(as	does	Schweizer,	2006).	This	is	also	theoretically	important	in	terms	of	the	moderation	effects	that	define	our	broadened	conceptualization	of	psychometric	complexity	and	our	new	conceptualization	of	psychometric	learning,	to	which	we	now	turn.		
Psychometric	Complexity	(!!):	Task	manipulations	that	result	in	monotonic	increases	in	the	association	between	task	performance	and	Gf	test	scores,	define	psychometric	complexity	(Birney	&	Bowman,	2009).	Psychometric	complexity	as	a	specific	type	of	statistical	moderation,	can	also	be	conceptualized	for	other	attributes	that	impact	on	reasoning	differentially	and	monotonically	as	a	function	of	increased	task	demand.	For	instance,	Neuroticism	has	been	implicated	in	cognitive	performance	(Beckmann	et	al.,	2013;	Debusscher,	Hofmans,	&	De	Fruyt,	2014).	If	changes	in	the	relationship	between	Neuroticism	and	reasoning	performance	differed	systematically	and	monotonically	across	the	36	RPM	items	as	a	function	of	item-difficulty	(controlling	for	item-order),	then	there	would	be	evidence	for	a	!! 	effect	for	Neuroticism.	This	is	what	we	observed.		
Psychometric	Learning		(!!):	We	introduce	psychometric	learning	as	a	new,	experientially-driven	concept	analogous	to	psychometric	complexity.	The	contribution	of	the	!!	concept	is	based	on	an	assumption	that	variables	that	statistically	moderate	individual	differences	in	item-order	
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progression,	after	controlling	for	item	complexity,	are	moderators	of	learning.	We	argue	that	under	these	circumstances,	the	sequential	item-to-item	progression	is	an	evolving	task-specific	experiential	factor	because	of	the	accumulation	of	experiences	associated	with	progression	through	the	RPM	test.	Thus,	if	changes	in	the	relationship	between	Neuroticism	and	reasoning	performance	differed	systematically	and	monotonically	across	the	36	RPM	items	as	a	function	of	item-order	(controlling	for	item-difficulty),	then	there	would	be	evidence	for	a	!!effect	for	Neuroticism.	This	is	what	we	observed.	Higher	Neuroticism	was	associated	with	a	decline	in	‘learning’.	Extending	the	application	of	psychometric	complexity	to	psychometric	learning,	by	proposing	a	theoretical	account	of	the	statistical	moderation	of	the	trajectory	of	item-order	performance	(controlling	for	item	difficulty),	moves	the	discussion	away	from	atheoretical	statistical	moderation	effects,	and	makes	clear	the	necessity	to	seek	out	and	experimentally	investigate	causal	pathways.	At	their	core,	!! 	and	!!	embrace	the	tradition	of	experimental	research	of	individual	differences,	as	they	are	based	on	an	examination	of	experimental	manipulations	(item-demand	and	item-order)	and	a	test	of	concomitant	changes	in	systematic	variance.	
Limitations	and	Future	Directions	While	we	have	argued	that	the	findings	of	this	research	are	compelling,	there	are	several	important	aspects	that	limit	generalisability	and	potentially	replicability.	These	include	the	fact	that	the	population	of	managers	our	sample	has	been	drawn	from	is	difficult	to	circumscribe;	implications	of	the	unique	personal	experiences	of	the	participants	is	hard	to	quantify	(e.g.,	some	are	highly	educated,	some	are	not;	some	were	born	and	raised	in	Australia,	some	were	not);	some	small	a	priori	differences	between	groups	were	apparent	in	personality	and	cognitive	constructs;	and	the	professional	learning	and	development	context	in	which	these	assessments	were	taken	
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cannot	easily	be	replicated.	Yet,	these	are	real	people,	working	within	contexts	where	psychometric	assessments	are	heavily	used	and	highly	valued.			The	cognition-personality	links	have	often	been	presented	more	as	static	descriptions	of	observed	associations	(Soubelet	&	Salthouse,	2011)	rather	than	as	dynamic	developmental,	causal	models.	The	various	explanatory	models	that	have	been	proposed,	of	which	the	work	of	Ackerman	and	his	colleagues	is	notable	(e.g.,	Ackerman,	1996;	Ackerman	&	Beier,	2003;	Cattell,	1987;	Kanfer	&	Ackerman,	1989;	Zimprich	et	al.,	2009),	have	been	based	on	correlational	data.	Our	data	is	certainly	still	predominantly	correlational,	although	we	have	introduced	an	experimental	manipulation	in	terms	of	the	requirement	to	provide	confidence	ratings.	The	requirement	for	some	participants	to	externalize	metacognitive	processing	by	reporting	confidence	in	the	correctness	of	their	response	is	not	part	of	the	standardized	RPM	administration.	As	such,	it	presents	somewhat	of	an	artificial	requirement	in	a	“real-world	context”.	However,	as	a	method	to	further	investigate	cognition-personality	associations,	it	shows	promise.	This	is	particularly	so	as	it	may	provide	a	basis	to	better	understand	the	bridge	between	personality	and	intelligence,	that	Stankov	(1999)	referred	to	as	the	“no	man’s	land”.	Current	work	in	our	lab	is	investigating	manipulations	of	item-order;	working	with	different	populations,	and	with	different	metacognitive	cues	and	non-cognitive	factors.		
Conclusion	Our	research	extends	the	cognition-personality	associations	observed	in	the	individual	difference	literature	to	item	performance	trajectories.	Moving	to	the	level	of	item	responses	and	introducing	experimental	manipulations	(e.g.,	confidence	ratings)	that	serve	as	catalysts	for	modification	of	cognition-personality	relations,	provide	an	important	avenue	for	integrating	experimental	and	differential	methods.	Performance	is	not	immune	to	being	asked	to	provide	
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confidence	ratings,	but	in	addition	to	their	theoretical	importance,	they	show	promise	as	an	experimental	tool.	Together	they	may	inform	causal	models	of	cognitive	performance	and	provide	the	basis	of	a	more	nuanced	account	of	self-regulation	of	resources	important	to	reasoning	and	learning.	We	finish	by	noting	that	our	work	supports	the	view	that	the	broader	context	of	a	cognitive	assessment	does	not	remain	constant.	It	is	fluid	and	differentially	impacts	performance	that	goes	beyond	the	intellect	being	measured.	We	proposed	a	conceptualization	of	psychometric	complexity	and	psychometric	learning	as	theoretically	derived	accounts	of	statistical	moderation	that	may	provide	a	bridge	to	causal	accounts.				
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Appendix	1	At	the	time	of	submission,	the	Accelerated	Learning	Laboratory	had	provided	leadership	training	program	to	students	and	industry	mangers.	An	analysis	of	a	subsample	of	the	industry	manager	data	is	reported	in	the	current	paper.		At	the	time	of	submission,	a	number	of	further	analyses	based	on	subsets	of	this	pool	of	participants	have	also	been	published,	including	(Beckmann	&	Birney,	2012;	Beckmann,	Beckmann,	Birney,	&	Wood,	2015;	Beckmann	et	al.,	2013;	Beckmann	et	al.,	2010;	Birney,	Beckmann,	&	Wood,	2012;	Birney,	Bowman,	Beckmann,	&	Seah,	2012;	Minbashian,	Wood,	&	Beckmann,	2010).	We	acknowledge	dependencies	in	reference	to	any	evidence	presented	in	support	of	theoretical	interpretation	based	on	these	common	participants	where	they	occur.	
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Appendix	2	Table	A2	Descriptive	statistics	(Mean	and	SD	in	parentheses)	and	Correlations	between	raw	scores	for	RPM	with	standard	(lower	triangle)	and	confidence	rating	(upper	triangle)	administration	conditions		
	Notes:	Cohen’s	d	between	condition	effect	size	(bold	=	95%	CI	does	not	contain	0);	RPM	Standard:		N	=	170,	for	r	>	.125	p	<	.05;	RPM	confidence:	N	=	81,	for	r	>	.184	p	<	.05;	bold	=	p	<	.05.	 	
Descriptive	Statistics Correlations
Moderators Cohen's	d (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RPM	Sum	Score (1) 22.54 (5.46) 22.67 (4.64) .025 .31 .50 .50 -.10 -.17 .15 -.26 -.30
Verbal	Reasoning (2) 50.24 (9.83) 53.68 (9.15) .358 .52 .51 .36 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.23 -.13
Numerical	Reasoning (3) 48.96 (9.49) 54.44 (9.99) .568 .64 .54 .54 -.04 -.04 -.14 -.09 -.03
Abstract	Reasoning (4) 54.74 (10.48) 55.53 (10.72) .075 .56 .30 .54 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.12 -.13
Openness (5) 66.40 (13.28) 71.17 (13.02) .361 .17 .24 -.04 .01 .22 -.15 .17 -.06
Extraversion (6) 60.80 (14.91) 61.23 (17.37) .027 .04 .07 -.04 -.01 .33 -.31 .05 .20
Neuroticsim (7) 32.64 (14.59) 28.54 (13.90) -.285 -.10 .02 -.14 -.12 -.10 -.39 -.47 -.18
Agreeableness (8) 71.61 (10.81) 74.79 (10.07) .301 .00 -.12 -.09 .04 .12 .07 -.35 .24
Conscientiousness (9) 69.01 (13.75) 72.59 (14.09) .258 -.08 -.14 -.03 .03 .03 .17 -.36 .33
Standard Confidence
BEYOND	THE	INTELLECT		39	
Appendix	3	Table	A3	Moderation	analyses	of	mean,	item-difficulty,	and	item-order	trajectories	by	condition		
	
		
	
Fixed	Effect:	Base	Model β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.860 0.053 16.16 245 0.000 2.362 (2.127,2.623)
Group -0.261 0.100 -2.62 245 0.009 0.770 (0.633,0.937)
SHL	Reasoning 0.646 0.047 13.65 245 0.000 1.907 (1.738,2.094)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.858 0.049 -17.55 247 0.000 0.424 (0.385,0.467)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.000 0.008 0.02 8431 0.983 1.000 (0.984,1.017)
Base	Model:	Deviance	=	24182.58;	Number	of	parameters	=	8
Fixed	Effect:	SHL	Reasoning β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.802 0.044 18.24 244 0.000 2.230 (2.045,2.432)
Group -0.118 0.098 -1.20 244 0.231 0.889 (0.733,1.078)
SHL	Reasoning 0.710 0.052 13.66 244 0.000 2.034 (1.836,2.253)
Group	x	SHL	Reasoning 0.187 0.106 1.76 244 0.080 1.205 (0.978,1.486)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.871 0.053 -16.48 244 0.000 0.419 (0.377,0.465)
Group -0.025 0.116 -0.21 244 0.833 0.976 (0.776,1.227)
SHL	Reasoning -0.020 0.060 -0.34 244 0.733 0.980 (0.871,1.102)
Group	x	SHL	Reasoning -0.183 0.119 -1.55 244 0.124 0.832 (0.659,1.052)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.001 0.009 0.13 8428 0.899 1.001 (0.984,1.019)
Group -0.024 0.020 -1.23 8428 0.217 0.976 (0.940,1.014)
SHL	Reasoning 0.005 0.010 0.44 8428 0.663 1.005 (0.984,1.025)
Group	x	SHL	Reasoning 0.035 0.018 1.92 8428 0.054 1.036 (0.999,1.074)
Deviance	=	24161.14;	Number	of	parameters	=	15,	χ2(7)	=	13.89,	p	=	.0184
Fixed	Effect:	Openness β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.854 0.051 16.84 243 0.000 2.348 (2.125,2.595)
Group -0.125 0.117 -1.06 243 0.289 0.883 (0.701,1.112)
Openness 0.009 0.004 2.45 243 0.015 1.009 (1.002,1.017)
SHL	Reasoning 0.634 0.048 13.08 243 0.000 1.885 (1.714,2.074)
Group	x	Openness -0.017 0.010 -1.72 243 0.087 0.983 (0.963,1.003)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.869 0.057 -15.13 244 0.000 0.419 (0.374,0.469)
Group 0.041 0.118 0.35 244 0.725 1.042 (0.827,1.314)
Openness -0.006 0.004 -1.47 244 0.143 0.994 (0.985,1.002)
Group	x	Openness -0.005 0.009 -0.55 244 0.581 0.995 (0.977,1.013)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.008 0.010 0.82 8428 0.412 1.008 (0.989,1.028)
Group -0.039 0.020 -1.98 8428 0.047 0.962 (0.926,1.000)
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.52 8428 0.604 1.000 (0.999,1.002)
Group	x	Openness 0.002 0.002 1.50 8428 0.133 1.002 (0.999,1.005)
Deviance	=	24156.37;	Number	of	parameters	=	16;	χ2(8)	=	26.22,	p	=	.0004
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Table	A3	(continued)		
	
							
Fixed	Effect:	Neuroticism β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.833 0.053 15.71 243 0.000 2.299 (2.072,2.553)
Group -0.096 0.096 -1.00 243 0.318 0.908 (0.751,1.098)
Neuroticism -0.001 0.003 -0.29 243 0.775 0.999 (0.992,1.006)
SHL	Reasoning 0.648 0.047 13.82 243 0.000 1.911 (1.743,2.096)
Group	x	Neuroticism 0.015 0.007 2.27 243 0.024 1.015 (1.002,1.028)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.862 0.057 -15.04 244 0.000 0.422 (0.377,0.473)
Group -0.027 0.111 -0.25 244 0.805 0.973 (0.782,1.211)
Neuroticism 0.007 0.003 2.36 244 0.019 1.007 (1.001,1.014)
Group	x	Neuroticism -0.009 0.007 -1.22 244 0.225 0.991 (0.977,1.005)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.009 0.010 0.94 8428 0.345 1.009 (0.990,1.028)
Group -0.030 0.019 -1.59 8428 0.113 0.971 (0.935,1.007)
Neuroticism -0.002 0.001 -2.67 8428 0.008 0.998 (0.997,1.000)
Group	x	Neuroticism 0.001 0.001 0.54 8428 0.586 1.001 (0.998,1.003)
Deviance	=	24157.39;	Number	of	parameters	=	16;	χ2(8)	=	25.19,	p	=	.0006
Fixed	Effect:	Agreeableness β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.834 0.052 16.16 243 0.000 2.302 (2.080,2.549)
Group -0.110 0.100 -1.11 243 0.270 0.896 (0.736,1.090)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.004 0.84 243 0.405 1.004 (0.995,1.013)
SHL	Reasoning 0.643 0.048 13.34 243 0.000 1.903 (1.731,2.093)
Group	x	Agreeableness -0.015 0.007 -2.06 243 0.040 0.986 (0.972,0.999)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.861 0.059 -14.57 244 0.000 0.423 (0.376,0.475)
Group -0.066 0.122 -0.54 244 0.592 0.936 (0.736,1.192)
Agreeableness -0.009 0.005 -1.92 244 0.055 0.991 (0.981,1.000)
Group	x	Agreeableness 0.021 0.010 2.07 244 0.039 1.021 (1.001,1.041)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.009 0.010 0.86 8428 0.389 1.009 (0.989,1.028)
Group -0.022 0.020 -1.08 8428 0.279 0.978 (0.940,1.018)
Agreeableness 0.001 0.001 1.62 8428 0.105 1.001 (1.000,1.003)
Group	x	Agreeableness -0.002 0.002 -1.38 8428 0.169 0.998 (0.995,1.001)
Deviance	=	24162.89;	Number	of	parameters	=	16;	χ2(8)	=	19.69,	p	=	.0042
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Table	A3	(continued)	
	
		
Notes:	β	=	unstandardized	regression	coefficient;	OR	=	Odds	ratio;	95%	CI	=	95%	confidence	interval	on	the	odds	ratio;	Group:	0	=	RPM	standard,	1	=	RPM	confidence;	All	moderators	are	grand-mean	centered.	Item-Difficulty	and	Item-Order	are	centered	at	0.	Test	of	deviance	is	based	on	a	comparison	with	the	reduced	base	model	of	Item-difficulty	and	Item-order	at	level	1,	and	condition	and	SHL	reasoning	at	level.	Confidence	intervals	including	1.0	are	suggestive	of	unreliable	associations.	
Fixed	Effect:	Extraversion β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.831 0.052 15.98 243 0.000 2.297 (2.073,2.544)
Group -0.141 0.097 -1.45 243 0.148 0.868 (0.717,1.052)
Extraversion 0.003 0.004 0.73 243 0.469 1.003 (0.995,1.010)
SHL	Reasoning 0.647 0.047 13.78 243 0.000 1.909 (1.741,2.094)
Group	x	Extraversion -0.012 0.006 -1.96 243 0.051 0.988 (0.977,1.000)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.848 0.058 -14.51 244 0.000 0.428 (0.382,0.481)
Group -0.053 0.114 -0.47 244 0.640 0.948 (0.758,1.186)
Extraversion 0.002 0.004 0.64 244 0.525 1.002 (0.995,1.010)
Group	x	Extraversion 0.003 0.009 0.39 244 0.699 1.003 (0.987,1.020)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.006 0.010 0.66 8428 0.511 1.006 (0.987,1.026)
Group -0.022 0.019 -1.12 8428 0.264 0.979 (0.942,1.016)
Extraversion -0.001 0.001 -0.88 8428 0.380 0.999 (0.998,1.001)
Group	x	Extraversion 0.000 0.002 0.11 8428 0.910 1.000 (0.997,1.003)
Deviance	=	24163.76;	Number	of	parameters	=	16;	χ2(8)	=	18.82,	p	=	.0057
Fixed	Effect:	Conscientiousness β SE t df p OR 95%	CI
Mean	RPM
Mean 0.826 0.053 15.62 243 0.000 2.284 (2.058,2.535)
Group -0.088 0.101 -0.87 243 0.385 0.915 (0.750,1.118)
Conscientiousness -0.004 0.003 -1.17 243 0.245 0.996 (0.990,1.003)
SHL	Reasoning 0.639 0.047 13.53 243 0.000 1.894 (1.726,2.079)
Group	x	Conscientiousness -0.011 0.007 -1.61 243 0.108 0.989 (0.976,1.002)
Difficulty	Trajectory
Mean -0.852 0.059 -14.57 244 0.000 0.426 (0.380,0.478)
Group -0.076 0.117 -0.65 244 0.515 0.927 (0.737,1.166)
Conscientiousness -0.006 0.004 -1.48 244 0.140 0.994 (0.986,1.002)
Group	x	Conscientiousness 0.015 0.008 1.92 244 0.056 1.016 (1.000,1.032)
Order	Trajectory
Mean 0.007 0.010 0.77 8428 0.443 1.008 (0.988,1.027)
Group -0.020 0.020 -1.01 8428 0.312 0.980 (0.943,1.019)
Conscientiousness 0.001 0.001 1.75 8428 0.081 1.001 (1.000,1.003)
Group	x	Conscientiousness -0.002 0.001 -1.85 8428 0.064 0.998 (0.995,1.000)
Deviance	=	24159.17;	Number	of	parameters	=	16;	χ2(8)	=	23.42,	p	=	.0011
